'American consumers might benefit if lenders provided greater mortgage product alternatives to the traditional fixed-rate mortgage.'
In spite of this optimism, the delinquency and foreclosure experience with respect to ARMs since 2004 has been poor. This poor performance has raised questions about whether a substantial portion of borrowers failed to understand the terms of the ARMs they were taking out. The National Association of Realtors, in a guide to ARMs and Fixed-Rate Mortgages (FRMs), highlights the potential concern: 'ARMs are difficult to understand. Lenders have much more flexibility when determining margins, caps, adjustment indexes, and other things, so unsophisticated borrowers can easily get confused or trapped by shady mortgage companies.' 3 This paper empirically investigates the characteristics of people who took out adjustable-rate mortgages. Is there legitimate cause for the concern expressed above?
Did adjustable-rate mortgage borrowers fully understand the possible consequences of entering their mortgage contracts, or did some of them unknowingly take on mortgages that exposed them to a high likelihood of foreclosure?
We present evidence that a lack of financial sophistication may have made a subset of households more likely to take up inappropriately risky mortgage products. In the 1992-2007 Surveys of Consumer Finances (SCF), interviewers rated both the ability of respondents to comprehend the financial questions in the survey and the degree to which respondents were suspicious of the interview. We use these two measures to identify households that might not understand a complex mortgage product and to identify households that are particularly skeptical in nature. We find that in the [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] period, mortgage borrowers who exhibited lower comprehension and less suspicion in the SCF interview were more likely to have adjustable-rate mortgages. The fact that these patterns are only present in 2004 and 2007 accords with the popular notion that the period immediately preceding the financial crisis witnessed an expansion of mortgage credit on terms that were not always fully understood by borrowers.
Our estimates indicate that during 2004 and 2007, a change in the comprehension
rating from 'Excellent' to 'Poor' was associated with a 6.6 percentage point increase in the probability that a homeowner with a mortgage had an ARM.
5 During this period, roughly 15 percent of mortgages reported by SCF respondents were ARMs; a 6.6
percentage point increase on that base is economically significant. For the years 2004 and 2007, the probability of having an ARM was 1.7 percentage points lower among households rated as somewhat suspicious relative to households rated as not suspicious, and the difference in probability for households rated by the interviewer as very suspicious was 6.9 percentage points. 6 Much previous work on the origins of the mortgage crisis has studied the moral hazard inherent in the originate-to-distribute lending model (Jiang, Nelson, and Vytlacil, 5 See Table 9A : the coefficient on understanding is 0.0219. The comprehension variable scaling (following Survey of Consumer Finances coding) runs from 1 to 4. 6 See Table 9A : the coefficient on pre-interview suspicion is -0.0173. SCF scaling of the suspicion variable runs from 1 (not suspicious), to 2 (somewhat suspicious), to 5 (very suspicious).
2010; Keys et al., 2010; Demyanyk and Van Hemert, forthcoming) . Taking as given the incentives of lenders and intermediaries that sell mortgages to be securitized, this paper focuses instead on borrowers and addresses the extent to which they were aware of the risks embedded in their mortgage contracts. The policy implications differ depending on whether borrowers who took on risky mortgages were making a deliberate bet on house price appreciation or were unwittingly assuming debt obligations they may have been unable to repay. Of course, these explanations are not mutually exclusive -there are certainly some borrowers who already owned primary residences but took out mortgages to purchase additional houses for investment purposes, and there are documented cases of mortgage originators fraudulently misrepresenting contract terms to borrowers.
The work most closely related to our analysis is a paper by Schwartz (2009), who finds evidence that the ARM market is split into two very different submarkets -a high income, wealthy segment and a low-income, credit-constrained segment. Our work expands on hers by exploring the cognitive and attitude-based characteristics of ARM borrowers, finding that an important segment of ARM borrowers may have had difficulty understanding the terms of the mortgages they were taking out.
In exploring the relationship between cognitive ability and mortgage choice, our research is related to the work of Bucks and Pence (2008) , who find that comprehension of mortgage terms is low among borrowers who are exposed to potentially large changes in their mortgage payments; the work of Agarwal et al. (2009) , who document that financial counseling for high-risk mortgage borrowers reduced both credit supply and credit demand; and the work of Gerardi, Goette, and Meier (2009) , who survey subprime borrowers in New England in 2008 and find that poor numerical ability is correlated with missed payments and default.
We do not view our findings on the cognitive and attitudinal correlates of ARM borrowing as inconsistent with work on the rational determinants of mortgage choice.
Koijen, Van Hemert, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2009) show that aggregate ARM share follows movements in the aggregate bond risk premium in a way that is consistent with a rational household timing model. Even if some fraction of households behaves rationally, there may be other households, in particular those with cognitive limitations, that end up with inappropriate mortgages.
Our paper also relates to recent research on the importance of trust in capital markets. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004) , looking at Italy, find that the areas of the country with higher levels of social trust have higher stock market participation and greater access to credit. Our paper shows a potential dark side to trust, or rather a bright side to suspicion: during the recent period, less trusting households appear to have more frequently avoided the type of mortgage that has been at the epicenter of abuse and crisis.
Our empirical analysis examines take-up of ARMs, as opposed to using some other criteria for identifying risky mortgages, for several reasons. First, ARMs indeed exhibited higher rates of foreclosure than fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs), at least in the earlier stages of the mortgage crisis. At the end of 2007, ARMs represented 22 percent of mortgages outstanding but 62% of foreclosures started (Mortgage Bankers Association).
This fact is not definitive evidence that an individual who switches from choosing a FRM to choosing an ARM has increased her risk of foreclosure, and some have argued that mortgage rate resets and other components of exotic ARMs were not directly responsible for the 2007 surge in delinquencies and foreclosures (Gerardi, Shapiro, and Willen, 2007; Sherlund, 2008; Mayer, Pence, and Sherlund, 2009 to risky mortgage products played a role in the recent mortgage boom and bust.
Data
This paper uses data from the Surveys of Consumer Finances (SCF), a large-scale survey of household income and wealth administered by the Federal Reserve Board.
The surveys ask a relatively comprehensive set of questions and have moderately large sample sizes. The survey is repeated on different respondents every three years, making the SCF a valuable resource for cross-period analysis. Each survey wave has combined an area probability sample with a high-income oversample, which allows the SCF to provide accurate information on broad population characteristics while also offering in-depth information on wealthy households. Our tabulations weight the various observations in the survey by their sampling weights so that our reported statistics should be representative of the U.S. population. For the OLS and probit regressions, we follow standard practice among SCF users and perform analysis on an unweighted basis.
Results
We first present summary statistics describing the evolution of homeownership and mortgage choice over the period [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . As shown in Table 2A shows the distribution of the responses to that question over each of the Surveys. The distribution is roughly stable over time, with about 20 percent of households reporting almost no shopping for credit and another 20 percent of households reporting a high taste for shopping around for the best terms when borrowing. Interviewer-reported pre-interview suspicion was higher among the lowestincome households. Controlling for other characteristics, pre-interview suspicion was relatively low among the households that report having the lowest wealth. Reported suspicion appears higher among non-white households than among white households and among the old than among the young. Households that report being credit constrained appear less suspicious, but households that report being risk-averse appear more suspicious. Suspicion of the interview appears somewhat higher in 2007 than in other years.
The SCF interviewers also reported respondents' apparent level of distrust at the conclusion of the interview (Table 4A and Table 4B ). Based on the interviewers' assessments, the level of distrust diminishes during the interview. The overall pattern of results for the post-interview suspicion variable is the same directionally as for the preinterview suspicion variable, but the magnitudes are attenuated, reflecting the lower overall level of suspicion once the interview is completed.
The SCF interviewers also reported on the respondents' apparent comprehension of the interview questions. Comprehension was recorded as excellent, good, fair, or poor.
The fraction of households with fair or poor understanding dropped from 12.1 percent to 8.6 percent over the 1992-2007 period, as reported in Table 5A . Fair or poor understanding was more concentrated among households headed by non-white respondents (Table 5B ) and among lower-income households. Among the households with income in the top quintile, only 3 percent were reported by the interviewer to have fair or poor comprehension of the survey questions. Among the lowest income quintile, fair or poor comprehension was reported for almost 25 percent.
A final variable that the interviewer assesses is the household's level of interest in the interview. We use this variable to capture a 'taste' for thinking about financial topics, and we include it as an independent variable in the regressions studying mortgage choice. Optimism has also been found to correlate with financial and other household decisions. We follow Puri and Robinson (2007) and construct a measure of optimism using a household's reported life expectancy. We construct an indicator variable for optimism equal to one for households whose self-reported life expectancy exceeds the life expectancy derived from population mortality tables. Table 7A and Table 7B describe the distribution of this variable: roughly half of households, by this measure, are coded as optimists. Not surprisingly, wealthier and higher income households are more optimistic by the life-expectancy-based measure. Also more optimistic are households that expect rising income, high school graduates, and households with higher tolerance for risk.
Our main results are presented in Tables 8-10. Table 8A and Optimists and those who report more credit shopping are also more likely to report having mortgages on their homes. Table 8B reports the marginal effects from probit regressions with the same dependent and independent variables. As with our other specifications, the results are similar, and we only show linear models for Table 9A,   Table 9B , and Table 10 .
In Table 9A and Table 9B , we explore the decision to have an adjustable-rate versus a fixed-rate mortgage. The sample is somewhat smaller than the sample in Table   8A and Table 8B ; only households with mortgages on their residences are included in the regressions. We add an independent variable capturing whether an 80 percent loan-tovalue mortgage would have been within the GSE conforming limit in the year that the mortgage was taken out. 8 Mortgages within the conforming limit are empirically much more likely to be fixed-rate mortgages than adjustable-rate mortgages, reflecting the role of the housing GSEs in the mortgage market.
The was associated with a 6.6 percentage point increase in the probability that a homeowner with a mortgage had an ARM. With respect to the suspicion variable, for the years 2004
and 2007, the probability of having an ARM was 1.7 percentage points lower among households rated as somewhat suspicious relative to households rated as not suspicious.
Households rated by the interviewer as very suspicious were 6.9 percentage points less likely to have ARMs. 8 The indicator variable for being within the conforming limit takes a value of one if 80% of the home value at the time of purchase is less than the conforming limit in the year the mortgage was taken out. The variable is imperfect to the extent that the year of home purchase and the year of mortgage origination do not coincide. Table 9B limits the sample to households that report taking out their mortgages in the past two years. The sample size is smaller in these regressions. The coefficient estimates for the understanding and suspicion variables are larger, as are the standard errors. On net, the t-statistics for these variables are similar across Tables 9A and 9B.
Although they are small in number in the SCF, we also investigate broker-sold ARMs. Because of potential incentive problems between brokers and the banks to which they sell mortgages, broker-sold mortgages have been identified as a particular problem in the recent mortgage crisis. The results of this analysis are in Table 10 . While Table   9A and Table 9B suggest that ARMs disproportionately went to the less-informed and less-skeptical, the results in Table 10 are mostly not statistically significant. The coefficients on the key variables are directionally similar to those from Table 9A and Table 9B . Tables 8A, 8B , 9A, 9B, and 10 include a wide range of control variables. We include demographic controls for age category (under 35, 35-44, 45-64, or over 65), race (white or nonwhite), income quintile, and net worth quintile. The pooled regressions include dummies for each year. We also include the household's selfassessed probability of remaining in the current house over the next two years (scaled from 0 to 100 percent); expectations about the future path of income (a dummy variable set to one for households that expect income growth to keep pace with or exceed price increases); and a dummy variable for self-reported credit constraints. The credit constraints variable is based on two questions in the Survey; the first asked whether the household had had a request for credit turned down, while the second asked whether the household had avoided asking for credit out of fear of being turned down. We code households as 'credit constrained' if they answered yes to either question. We also have two additional variables: a measure of the household's self-reported risk aversion (higher values correspond to greater aversion to risk) and a dummy variable for high school dropouts.
The regressions in
With these additional variables, there is some concern about reverse causation.
For example, a household's self-reported probability of having to move may be a function of the type of mortgage taken out. Nevertheless, the coefficients on the variables are interesting. In Table 9A , the results suggest that starting in 2001, ARMs were often used by households who reported a lower probability of staying in their current home. The magnitude of the effect is large: pooling all years, changing from a 0 percent to a 100 percent probability of moving implied an 8 percentage point (0.0008 * 100, from Table 9A ) increase in the probability of having an ARM. In (only) the 2004 Survey, ARMs were disproportionately used by households that expected income to rise or at least stay the same.
The evidence in Table 9A suggests that as far back as 1995, there has been a correlation between ARM use and self-reported credit constraints, with ARMs being more common among the constrained. Finally, ARMs were in general less common among the more risk averse, although the strength of this effect varied from year to year.
Conclusion
Among households with mortgage debt, those who experienced little difficulty comprehending financial questions or who were suspicious of the SCF interview were less likely to have adjustable-rate mortgages, controlling for a wide range of other 16 factors. Furthermore, these relationships were strongest in the years immediately preceding the mortgage meltdown that began in 2007. These results suggest that an interaction between complicated financial products and household behavioral and cognitive characteristics played a role in the recent housing-based financial crisis. 
